- Syllabus – EconS 424, Spring 2026
- Class slides classified by topics:
- Introduction to games, ingredients, and representation.
- Common knowledge of rationality in:
- Dominance solvable games: Application of Iterative Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS) and Iterative Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies (IDWDS).
- Nash equilibrium in games with two players.
- Nash equilibrium in games with N players.
- Application: Strategizing in courses that curve grades.
- Nash equilibrium with continuous action spaces.
- Application: Imperfect competitive markets.
- Application: Matching grants in public good games.
- Application: Average bid auctions in Italian cities.
- Mixed strategy equilibria (msNE) with two players.
- Application: Sticking to your strategy.
- Mixed strategy equilibria (msNE) with N players.
- Mixed Strategies at the Movies: High Noon, Glengarry Glen Ross, and The Platform.
- Strictly competitive games, and max-min strategies.
- Max-Min Strategies at the Movies: Penalty Kicks, Das Root, and Rounders.
- Sequential-move games, and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPNE).
- Application: The game of Checkers is solved.
- Application: “Split or Steal” game in Golden Balls.
- Strategic pre-commitment.
- Pre-Commitment at the Movies: Dr. Strangelove, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, and Ransom.
- Bargaining games over finite and infinite periods.
- Repeated games:
- Introduction to finitely and infinitely-repeated games.
- Extensions (imperfect monitoring, “stick and carrot” strategies, etc.).
- Optional: Repeated Games at the Movies: Bridge of Spies, Groundhog Day, and Trainspotting.
- Optional: Overlapping generations models.
- Games of incomplete information – Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE):
- Introduction to games of incomplete information and BNE.
- Application: Beliefs on types in the market for automobiles.
- Application: BNE at the Movies: The Hunt for Red October, Trading Places, and The Usual Suspects.
- Applications of BNE to games with continuous actions:
- Cournot competition under incomplete information.
- Auction Theory. Paper and Slides.
- More applications of BNE – Information aggregation among several players.
- From Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). Link and Handout.
- A systematic procedure for finding all pure-strategy PBEs: Paper and slides.
- Applications of PBE:
- How to find Semi-separating PBEs (involving mixed strategies):
- Cheap Talk games (signaling with costless messages):
- Signaling games in which both players (sender and receiver) are privately informed about their own type.
- Equilibrium refinement criteria (the “Intuitive Criterion” and the “Divinity Criterion”).
- Chapter 11, equilibrium refinement criteria.
- You can find more details about the application of these two refinement criteria, including worked-out examples, here: Paper and Slides.
- Introduction to games, ingredients, and representation.
- Game Theory web tutor, initially developed for Game Theory: An Introduction with Step-by-Step Examples. (Choose numerical exercises and adjust the difficulty level as needed.)
- Weekly review sessions (practice exercises with answers):
- Representation of games and strategies.
- Dominated strategies and Nash equilibrium (with extra exercises).
- Nash equilibrium in games with continuous action spaces.
- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.
- Backward induction and subgame perfection.
- Bargaining games and repeated games I
- Repeated games II
- Games with incomplete information I
- Games with incomplete information II and Auction Theory
- Signaling games I
- Signaling games II
- Signaling games III
- You can find detailed answer keys to over 150 exercises in my book: Strategy and Game Theory, Practice Exercises with Answers, Springer-Verlag (2nd edition), Link and eBook format.
- Homework assignments:
- Exams: