**Common Pool Resources: Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information**, with Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Cambridge University Press, October 2021.

**Main features:**

- The textbook offers a short introduction to strategic behavior in common pool resources.
- It uses a game-theory approach to find equilibrium behavior, identify the socially optimal appropriation, and measure inefficiencies.
- It offers several algebra and calculus steps, so students can reproduce the analysis and apply it in their own research.
- Summarizes experimental studies and provides references for further reading.
- Solutions to all odd-numbered exercises at the end of the book.

**Ancillary materials for instructors: **

*Solutions Manual*, with detailed answer keys to all end-of-chapter exercises.*PowerPoint slides*of all chapters to facilitate teaching preparation.

Table of Contents, Slides, Book website in Amazon, eBook format, Errata file.

**Auction Theory: Introductory Exercises with Answer Keys**, with Pak-Sing Choi, Springer-Nature, May 2021.

This textbook presents 83 exercises on auction theory with detailed answer keys. The exercises emphasize the game-theoretic tools that help us predict bidders’ equilibrium behavior in different auction formats, along with the seller’s expected revenues in each auction format. We also include several exercises based on published articles, with the model reduced to its main elements and the question divided into several easy-to-answer parts. Little mathematical background in algebra and calculus is assumed, and most algebraic steps and simplifications are provided, making the text ideal for upper-undergraduate and graduate students.

The book begins with a discussion of second-price auctions and works through progressively more complicated auction scenarios: first-price auctions, all-pay auctions, third-price auctions, the Revenue Equivalence principle, common-value auctions, multi-unit auctions, and procurement auctions.

**Main features:**

- Detailed answer keys to 83 exercises on auction theory.
- Algebra support and step-by-step calculations.
- Economic intuition behind each results.
- Exercises ranked according to difficulty (Undergraduate, Masters, and PhD).
- Several exercises based on published articles.
- Ideal for courses on game theory, market design, economics of information, or topics in microeconomics.

Book’s website in Amazon, eBook format, and Errata file.

**Intermediate Microeconomic Theory: Tools and Step-by-Step Examples**, with Ana Espinola-Arredondo, MIT Press, October 2020.

**A short, rigorous introduction to intermediate microeconomic theory that offers worked-out examples, tools for solving exercises, and algebra support.**

This book takes a concise, example-filled approach to intermediate microeconomic theory, focusing on worked-out examples and step-by-step solutions.

**Main features:**

- Step-by-step tools for solving exercises, offering a common approach for solving similar problems.
- Algebra steps, only a basic math background is required.
- Behavioral economics applications in most chapters.
- Several worked-out examples in every chapter.
- 125 in-chapter examples.
- 140 self-assessment exercises.
- Ideal for online courses and remote instruction.

**Ancillary teaching materials for instructors: **

*Solutions Manual*, with detailed answer keys to all self-assessment and all end-of-chapter exercises (481 exercises in total).*PowerPoint slides*of all chapters to facilitate teaching preparation.

Instructors interested in the title can visit the MIT Press website to request copies: **Link**

Table of Contents, Book’s website in Amazon, eBook purchase, eBook rental (one semester or one year), and Errata file.

**Practice Exercises for Intermediate Microeconomic Theory**, with Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Eric Dunaway, and John Strandholm, MIT Press, October 2020.

The book provides readable step-by-step answer keys, with algebra support. It enables students to approach similar exercises on their own, emphasizing the economic intuition behind mathematical results.

**Main features:**

- Detailed answer keys to all 140 self-assessment exercises in
*Intermediate Microeconomic Theory.* - Detailed solutions to the 173 odd-numbered end-of-chapter exercises in
*Intermediate Microeconomic Theory.* - Over 310 exercises with answer keys in total.

Book’s website in Amazon, and eBook format. Errata file.

**Industrial Organization: Practice Exercises with Answer Keys**, with Pak-Sing Choi and Eric Dunaway, Springer-Nature, January 2021.

This textbook presents 122 exercises on industrial organization with detailed answer keys. The book emphasizes the game-theoretic tools used in each type of exercise, so students can systematically apply them to other markets, forms of competition, or information environments where firms, consumers, and regulating agencies interact.

The book begins with monopoly, the Cournot model of simultaneous quantity competition, the Bertrand model simultaneous price competition, and sequential competition. The following chapters apply game-theoretic tools to regulation, R&D incentives, mergers and collusion, bundling incentives, incomplete information, signaling, networks, and switching costs. Most chapters also offer exercises based on published journal articles, to help readers extend these articles in their own research.

**Main features:**

- Detailed answer keys to 122 exercises on industrial organization.
- Algebra support and step-by-step calculations.
- Economic intuition behind the results.
- Exercises ranked according to difficulty (Undergraduate, Masters, and PhD).
- Several exercises based on published articles.
- Ideal for online courses and remote instruction.

**Advanced Microeconomic Theory: An Intuitive Approach with Examples**

This textbook emphasizes the intuition behind the mathematical assumptions, includes many step-by-step examples helping students transition from theory to practice, and discusses applications from behavioral and experimental economics within each chapter.

The book is mainly oriented to Masters students in Economics, Finance and Public Policy; to upper undergraduate students; and to PhD students in programs with an applied focus. Every chapter starts with the basics topics using as little math as possible, and covers the standard topics in Masters Microeconomics courses (and most topics in first-year PhD Micro). The book includes chapters on:

- Preference relations and utility functions.
- Demand theory
- Applications of demand theory
- Production theory
- Choice under uncertainty
- Partial and general equilibrium
- Monopoly and monopsony.
- Game theory
- Imperfect competition and entry
- Externalities and public goods
- Contract theory.

**Main features:**

- Emphasizes economic intuition.
- 124 in-chapter examples, applying theoretical results to specific functional forms.
- Includes behavioral economics sections.

**Ancillary teaching materials for instructors: **

*Solutions Manual*, with detailed answer keys to all end-of-chapter exercises; and*PowerPoint slides*of all chapters, to facilitate teaching preparation.

Instructors interested in the title can visit the MIT Press website to request copies: **Link**

Book’s website in Amazon, eBook format, and Errata file.

**Practice Exercises for Advanced Microeconomic Theory**

- It provides solutions and step-by-step explanations for all the odd-numbered exercises (107 problems in total) in
*Advanced Microeconomic Theory: An Intuitive Approach with Examples*. - Readable answer keys, presenting each step and result, and emphasizing the economic intuition behind each finding.
- It can help students improve both students’ theoretical and practical preparation, in homework assignments and exams.

Book’s website in Amazon, eBook format, and Errata file.

Strategy and Game Theory, Practice Exercises with Answers, **2nd edition**, with Daniel Toro-Gonzalez. ** New reprint December 2020**.

This textbook presents detailed answers to 134 exercises on Game Theory, emphasizing the economic intuition behind each step and result. Every chapter starts by presenting a quick review of the basic theoretical tools, then describes introductory games discussed in most undergraduate courses, and gradually advances to more challenging games appropriate for Masters and PhD-level courses.

The step-by-step presentation of every exercise seeks to help students understand how to systematically apply solution concepts to different fields of Economics, Business, and Political Science.

**Changes in the 2nd edition: **The second edition revises several exercises and includes 40 additional exercises at the introductory and intermediate level; about 200 new pages, for over 150 exercises in total. These new exercises expand the scope of the book to be appropriate for upper undergraduate students. The new edition also includes a new chapter devoted entirely to Cheap Talk games, considering both discrete and continuous types.

We provide a short list of the main topics we cover below:

**Complete information games:**- Strictly dominated strategies, strictly dominant strategies, iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS), iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IDWDS), and dominance solvable games.
- Pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We first present canonical two-players games, such as the Prisoner’s dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Coordination games, and Anticoordination games. We then study games with 3 players, and finally games with N players.
- Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We also start with two-players, such as the Matching Pennies, and then generalize to games with
*N*players. - Strictly Competitive Games and maxmin strategies.
- Sequential-move games, backward induction, and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPNE).
- Applications to Industrial Organization (mainly considering simultaneous- or sequential-move games).
- Repeated games and Correlated equilibrium.

**Incomplete information games:**- Simultaneous-move games and Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE).
- Auctions (as an application of BNEs).
- Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) and signaling games.
- Signaling games: first with two types of sender, and then with three types of sender.
- Cheap-talk games.
- Equilibrium refinements (Cho and Kreps’ Intuitive Criterion).
- More advanced signaling games and PBE.

Book’s website in Amazon, and eBook format.

Errata file (second edition, new reprint, only applicable for books printed *after* November 2020), Errata file (second edition, only applicable for books printed *before* November 2020).

The set focuses on the economic and strategic aspects of interactions among various parts of society, all dependent on the utilization of limited natural resources and their impact on the environment. Policy implications are addressed, including current challenges and future perspectives.