Intermediate Microeconomic TheoryIntermediate Microeconomic Theory: Tools and Step-by-Step Examples, with Ana Espinola-Arredondo, MIT Press, Forthcoming October 2020.

A short, rigorous introduction to intermediate microeconomic theory that offers worked-out examples, tools for solving exercises, and algebra support.

This book takes a concise, example-filled approach to intermediate microeconomic theory, focusing on worked-out examples and step-by-step solutions. Each chapter presents theoretical models and then offers several examples and applications. The book provides step-by-step tools for solving standard exercises, offering students a common approach for solving similar problems. The book walks readers through algebra steps and calculations, so only a basic background in algebra and calculus is assumed. The book includes 140 self-assessment exercises, giving students an opportunity to apply concepts from previous worked-out examples.

Ancillary materials for instructors: 

  • Solutions Manual, with detailed answer keys to all self-assessment exercises and all end-of-chapter exercises (481 exercises in total).
  • Editable PowerPoint slides of all chapters, which should facilitate teaching preparation for instructors teaching the class.


Practice Exercises for Intermediate Microeconomic Theory, with Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Eric Dunaway, and John Strandholm,  MIT Press, Forthcoming October 2020.

Detailed answer keys to all 140 self-assessment exercises and solutions to the 173 odd-numbered end-of-chapter exercises in Intermediate Microeconomic Theory (313 exercises with answer keys in total).

It provides readable step-by-step explanations and algebra support, enabling students to approach similar exercises on their own, emphasizing the economic intuition behind mathematical results.



Advanced Microeconomic Theory: An Intuitive Approach with Examples

Relative to other textbooks in the market: (1) it emphasizes the intuition behind the mathematical assumptions, (2) includes many step-by-step examples helping students transition from theory to practice, and (3) discusses applications from behavioral and experimental economics within each chapter.

The book is mainly oriented to Masters students in Economics, Finance and Public Policy; to upper undergraduate students; and to PhD students in programs with an applied focus. Every chapter starts with the basics topics using as little math as possible, and covers the standard topics in Masters Microeconomics courses (and most topics in first-year PhD Micro). The book includes chapters on:

  1. Preference relations and utility functions.
  2. Demand theory
  3. Applications of demand theory
  4. Production theory
  5. Choice under uncertainty
  6. Partial and general equilibrium
  7. Monopoly and monopsony.
  8. Game theory
  9. Imperfect competition and entry
  10. Externalities and public goods
  11. Contract theory.

Ancillary materials for instructors: 

  • Solutions Manual, with detailed answer keys to all end-of-chapter exercises; and
  • Editable PowerPoint slides of all chapters, which should facilitate teaching preparation for instructors teaching the class.

Instructors interested in the title can visit the MIT Press website to request copies:  Link

Book’s website in Amazon

Errata file



Practice Exercises for Advanced Microeconomic Theory

It provides solutions and step-by-step explanations for all the odd-numbered exercises (107 problems in total) in the above book Advanced Microeconomic Theory: An Intuitive Approach with Examples.

The answer keys seek to be readable, present each step and result, and emphasize the economic intuition behind each finding. In combination with the textbook, this workbook can help students improve both their theoretical and practical preparation, in homework assignments and exams.

Book’s website in Amazon

Errata file.



Strategy and Game Theory, Practice Exercises with Answers, 2nd edition, with Daniel Toro-Gonzalez.

This textbook presents detailed answers to 134 exercises on Game Theory, emphasizing the economic intuition behind each step and result. Every chapter starts by presenting a quick review of the basic theoretical tools, then describes introductory games discussed in most undergraduate courses, and gradually advances to more challenging games appropriate for Masters and PhD-level courses.

The step-by-step presentation of every exercise seeks to help students understand how to systematically apply solution concepts to different fields of Economics, Business, and Political Science.

2nd edition: The second edition revises several exercises and includes 40 additional exercises at the introductory and intermediate level; about 200 new pages. These new exercises expand the scope of the book to be appropriate for upper undergraduate students. The new edition also includes a new chapter devoted entirely to Cheap Talk games, considering both discrete and continuous types.

We provide a short list of the main topics we cover below:

  1. Complete information games:
    1. Strictly dominated strategies, strictly dominant strategies, iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS), iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IDWDS), and dominance solvable games.
    2. Pure strategy Nash equilibrium. We first present canonical two-players games, such as the Prisoner’s dilemma, Battle of the Sexes, Coordination games, and Anticoordination games. We then study games with 3 players, and finally games with N players.
    3. Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We also start with two-players, such as the Matching Pennies, and then generalize to games with N players.
    4. Strictly Competitive Games and maxmin strategies.
    5. Sequential-move games, backward induction, and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPNE).
    6. Applications to Industrial Organization (mainly considering simultaneous- or sequential-move games).
    7. Repeated games and Correlated equilibrium.
  2. Incomplete information games:
    1. Simultaneous-move games and Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE).
    2. Auctions (as an application of BNEs).
    3. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) and signaling games.
    4. Signaling games: first with two types of sender, and then with three types of sender.
    5. Cheap-talk games.
    6. Equilibrium refinements (Cho and Kreps’ Intuitive Criterion).
    7. More advanced signaling games and PBE.

Book’s website in Amazon

Errata file (second edition)

Errata file (first edition)  (only applicable for books printed before June 2017).



WSPC Reference on Natural Resources and Environmental Policy in the Era of Global Change  (Volume dedicated to Game Theory)

The set focuses on the economic and strategic aspects of interactions among various parts of society, all dependent on the utilization of limited natural resources and their impact on the environment. Policy implications are addressed, including current challenges and future perspectives.


Book’s website in Amazon